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POLICY NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION:
A RESEARCH AGENDA

JOHN T. SCHOLZ1
RICHARD C. FEIOCK2
AND

T.K. AHN1

Policy fragmentation in the American federalist system leads to inefficiencies as decisions by one
authority impose positive and negative externalities on other authorities and their constituencies.
The Center for the Study of Federalism and Institutional Collective Action, will focus on the role
of policy networks in shaping coordinated decisions that enhance the joint outcomes among
governmental authorities. We develop and test two competing perspectives relating networks to
collective action, one emphasizing the role of tightly-clustered “strong-tie” relationships
capable of enhancing the credibility of commitments among network members, and the other
emphasizing the role of extensive, “weak-tie” relationships linking diverse stakeholders in
enhancing the shared information required to coordinate collective decisions.
Our previous projects established the importance of local policy networks in enhancing
compliance with federal regulations and developing coordinated policy agreements in local
watersheds. The research provides initial evidence that extensive weak-tie networks play the
most critical role in establishing joint projects, at least among specialized authorities managing
an estuary’s natural resources. The proposed inquiry focuses on two critical settings, one
emphasizing horizontal fragmentation (the joint provision of local services by municipalities),
and the other emphasizing vertical fragmentation (the development of joint projects among
federal, state, and local resource management agencies). In each setting, we develop relevant
formal models about the capabilities of different network structures and test them using an array
of archival and survey data.
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Policy Networks and Institutional Collective Action
John T. Scholz, Richard C. Feiock, and T.K. Ahn
Florida State University
The American federalist system offers multiple advantages by dispersing power,
developing multiple channels of representation, and encouraging multiple centers of creativity,
but fragmentation of authority can result in problems of cooperation across multiple policy
arenas. Globalization and the growing interconnection between specialized geographic and
functional economies have dramatically increased the impact of one policy arena’s decisions in
other arenas, leading to substantial positive and negative externalities. When positive
externalities exist, the political authorities, agencies, and stakeholders in multiple policy arenas
can increase their own and the broader public’s benefits by coordination of decisions to
maximize joint returns. When negative externalities exist, cooperation among the independent
actors can again enhance joint returns.
Our research agenda focuses on the study of coordination and cooperative solutions to the
problem of fragmentation, which Feiock (2004) labeled the study of Institutional Collective
Action (ICA). Federalist systems encounter ICA in two primary settings, one involving
horizontal relationships (e.g., municipalities in a metropolitan area, specialized departments in
the federal government), one involving vertical relationships (e.g., federal, state, and local water
pollution authorities). Centralization remains an attractive option (as in the Homeland Security
and more recently the Intelligence responses to coordination problems for countering terrorism),
but imposes large costs, loses much of the advantages offered by federalism, and can only be
imposed on a very limited number of issues. Privatization can reduce coordination problems in
situations were markets can be created, but raises further problems of control and coordination.
The role of centralization and privatization in ICA is already being extensively studied.
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The role of policy networks in resolving ICA problems, on the other hand, has more
recently attracted attention among scholars and policy makers alike (Bressers and O’Toole 1998,
Provan and Milward 2001). Informal connections and ties among agencies and their relevant
stakeholders can reduce the impediments to developing and implementing coordinated policy
solutions. The polycentric nature of the American political system implies that many policy
outcomes depend on cooperation and coordination among multiple actors. Any of these multiple
interactions can be properly modeled as a game; the actors have goals, beliefs about others’ goals
and beliefs, and are constrained in resources and choice options; the agents try to achieve their
desired outcomes while taking other actors’ potential actions in mind. The interactions between
regulating agencies and regulated firms, cooperation and conflict among stakeholders to a policy
problem, contracts among multiple local governments for public service provisions are examples
involving ICA that can be properly modeled and analyzed as games.
For the past several decades, major advances in the social sciences have been made as
scholars analyzed the micro-level foundations to explain observed macro-level phenomena.
Game theory and network analysis are two of the most important tools of such micro-level
analysis. Game theory provides tools to model how preferences, beliefs, and constraints affect
choices in strategic (or interactive) decision-making situations. Evolutionary game theory, while
typically relaxing the strict rationality assumption of the standard, non-cooperative game theory,
allows one to study how the choices and/or preferences evolve as the agents learn in repeated
interactions. Network analysis, on the other hand, looks at the way multiple interactions of a
certain kind are connected to each other and studies how the configuration of the interactions
affect the outcomes for individuals and the group as a whole.
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Though each had made significant contributions in isolation, we believe that the two
approaches combined will provide a powerful new tool to better understand many important
social interactions. At the theoretical level, what we propose is an analysis of networked-games.
Specialized federal, state, and local agencies can dramatically impact each other’s policies in a
given ecosystem, and dozens of local governmental units in a metropolitan area form a web of
contracts for public service delivery. The way in which these games are connected may have
important consequences; the agents may be constrained in using different strategies for different
games; the agents could observe actions and outcomes for several connected actors and learn
from them.

3. PRELIMINARY STUDIES THAT SHAPED OUR ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
John Scholz directed several recent NSF projects that empirically established the
important role of policy networks in vertical ICA settings involving conflicts among specialized
agencies. Partnerships, or formalized local policy networks, evolve to coordinate policies in
watersheds that have greater problems and more social capital (Lubell et al 2002). Federal
programs can successfully enhance the size and diversity of local policy networks (Schneider et
al 2003). Local networks increase the Environmental Protection Agency’s enforcement efforts
and, more importantly, enhance compliance with clean water regulations by nurturing local
cooperation (Scholz and Wang 2003). Finally, dispersed weak-tie networks appear to be more
effective than clustered strong-tie networks in developing joint cooperative projects (Scholz,
Berardo and Kile 2004). Our primary hypotheses elaborate this finding
Richard Feiock’s research empirically investigates how institutional structures and policy
interactions influence local government policy and performance in horizontal ICAs (Feiock
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2002; 2004a). Products from Feiock’s NSF supported study of local economic development
have provided empirically support the importance of interlocal relations to collective policy
choices. The frequency of interlocal service agreements in metropolitan areas reduced
transaction costs and facilitated establishment of regional development agreements (Feiock,
Johnson and Tao 2004). Social capital produced though interlocal relations increased the
likelihood that a regional partnership would form to promote development (Park and Feiock
2003; 2005). The scope of a city development organization’s ego network was strongly related
to participation joint ventures with neighboring communities. Ongoing work sponsored by
Aspen Institute demonstrates how transaction costs similarly influence service contracting by
local governments (Feiock, Clingermayer and Dasse 2003; Feiock and Jang 2004). Finally,
preliminary evidence from a recent NSF grant investigating land use decisions Florida’s
metropolitan areas confirms the mediating role of local institutions in mediating land use
decisions (Feiock 2004b; Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez, 2005).
T.K. Ahn is trained in game theory, especially in behavioral, evolutionary, and
experimental game theory that incorporates norms in explaining cooperation. He has
collaborated with Elinor Ostrom, a pioneer in the study of institutions of collective action, on
studies of environmental change (Gibson, Ahn, and Ostrom 2000), social capital (Ostrom and
Ahn, 2001, 2004; Ahn and Ostrom 2002), and experimental social dilemmas (Ahn, Ostrom, and
Walker 2003, Ahn et al. 2001, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2001). His extensive experience as a
graduate student and post-doctoral fellow at the Workshop in Political Analysis and Policy at
Indiana University will play a critical role in helping develop the proposed research into a
cornerstone for the planned CSFICA.
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The research agenda described here enables us to integrate these three important strands,
combining the empirical strengths demonstrated in Scholz’s focus on vertical problems and
Feiock’s on horizontal problems with the theoretical strengths and formal modeling skills of
Ahn.

4. RESEARCH PLANS
As an introduction to our research, Figure 1 compares networks in two estuaries
identified by asking policy makers in each estuary which other organizations they contact on a
regular basis. The survey instrument for Tampa Bay is included in the appendix. Several
concepts from network theories can be used to characterize the difference between the two
networks, but the most conspicuous is the
Tampa Bay Estuary Sub-network

St. Andrews Estuary Sub-network
SWFWMD
Tampa Bay Regional
Planning Council

Gulf Community College

Bay County Public
Utilities Company

Audubon Society

Univ. of South Florida
Hillsborough
County EPC

FLDEP

Committee for Sensible
Airport Development

FLDEP

Pinellas County Govt

Tampa Bay NEP

USFWS

FL Wildlife
Federation

St. Andrews Bay
Resource Management
Association

FL Marine Reserve
Institute

Figure 1. Policy (sub)networks in Tampa Bay and St. Andrews Estuary

greater density of the Tampa Bay network on the left. Empirically, we have found that larger,
interconnected networks (such as Tampa Bay) lead to greater agreement and more positive
assessments of environmental policies (Schneider 2003). We can also show with formal models
of networked games (Ahn, 2004; Esarey 2004) that the denser Tampa Bay sub-network is more
resistant to the invasion of defection strategy than the St. Andrews network, and hence should
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support more cooperation. On the other hand, we also found that stakeholders who participated
in more joint projects actually had low density networks with many bridging contacts of
stakeholders who did not know each other
These findings reflect a major dispute about whether dense or bridging networks are best
able to resolve collective action problems (Burt 1992, 2000). We propose to develop and test
two primary hypotheses that we believe can resolve this dispute. First, strong-tie networks are
best at enhancing credibility and trust required to resolve cooperation problem (Coleman 1988),
as encountered in the implementation of joint projects where defection by other participants
poses considerable risks. Second, weak-tie bridging networks are best at obtaining and
distributing information (Granovetter 1973) required to resolve coordination problems, a major
concern in the planning and development stages of joint undertakings. Thus we expect
stakeholders with larger bridging networks to dominate in planning, but stakeholders with denser
networks to do better in implementation stages of joint undertakings.
We can test these hypotheses by observing three nested layers of network relationships.
Resource Networks correspond to the usual perspective in which information or other resources
flow from one “node” to other notes, and can be identified through surveys of self-reported
contacts. Contract Networks are patterns of membership in joint projects observed from available
lists, which reflect some level of coordination in joint planning process. Performance Networks
record the pattern of payoffs each stakeholder gains and strategies (cooperate or defect) each
stakeholder pursues with each of the stakeholders in the full set of joint projects in the estuary.
These networks reflect the problem of maintaining cooperation even after initial agreements have
been established (Ostrom 1990, 1992). The pattern of performance can be measured objectively
for projects from milestones achieved or efficiency of service delivery, and subjectively for each
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pair of stakeholders through surveys in which stakeholders assess the contribution by others and
the ratio of costs and benefits the stakeholder’s organization gains from the project.
To the extent that contract networks reflect primarily informational problems, hypothesis
two implies that those stakeholders with bridging resource networks will be involved in greater
numbers of joint projects. To the extent that performance networks reflect primarily credibility
problems associated with maintaining cooperation, hypothesis one above implies that
stakeholders with dense resource networks will gain greater rewards as reflected in the
performance networks. Given the hypothesized advantage of bridges for planning and dense
networks for implementation, we anticipate that the overall pattern of resource networks will
evolve toward “small world” networks (Watts 1999) capable of developing bridges while
maintaining high density for most stakeholders.
Formal Analysis: The theoretical component of our research program will focus on
developing models of networked games using analytical and computational methods. In general,
a networked game can be represented by a set of agents, links among agents, and the learning
rules of the agents. Agents are defined by their strategies and/or preferences, the links represent a
game (in game theoretic sense), and the learning rules specifies the changes in agents
strategies/preferences as functions of their payoffs, payoffs of other agents, and the links among
agents. In the aforementioned example of the two networks, we used a finitely repeated game,
Tit-for-Tat and Always Defect as two types of agents, and the localized imitation of the most
successful as the learning rule. But of course, this is the simplest example. The framework of
networked, evolutionary game can accommodate a wide rage of game forms, strategies, and
learning rules. We will explore diverse combinations of these assumptions, from the simplest to
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more sophisticated strategies and learning rules, to reflect the choice situations found in our
empirical research.
Empirical Analysis: Vertical ICAs and Tampa Bay Our first research site involves an
exemplary site of polycentric order (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961): Tampa Bay’s multiple
specialized agencies at local, state, and federal levels have conflicting, overlapping authority
over natural resources. We investigate how resource networks among these agencies, their
political overseers, and other non-governmental actors affect the likelihood that they will enter
into successful joint environmental projects (contract network), and how both the resource and
contract networks affect performance in joint projects.
We build on two prior rounds of quasi-panel surveys in 1999 and 2001 directed by
Scholz. The 2005 survey will map all networks in Tampa Bay, overcoming the major
measurement problems due to the partial mapping in the earlier studies (Scholz, Berardo and
Kile 2004). In addition, the new survey will measure the contract and performance networks
based on all joint projects identified by the Tampa Bay National Estuary Program, which has an
extensive data base with evaluations of each project. Finally, the panel of surveys over a 6-year
period will allow us to analyze the dynamic development of networks over time.
Empirical Analysis: Three Studies of Horizontal ICAs in Metropolitan Areas. We
extend research by Feiock on agreements among multiple local governments for three policy
issues: public service provision, developments of regional impact, and regional developmental
cooperation among multiple local governmental units in the metropolitan areas. Network
relationships revealed through surveys of city and county government officials as well as
archival data will measure resource, contract, and performance networks for each issue in the
334 Florida cities in counties with populations over 100,000.

8

Interlocal Agreements (ILAs). ILAs are legal agreements that establish specific roles and
responsibilities of two or more jurisdictions providing a common service. ILAs are extensive in
metropolitan areas and most cities report more than one agreement. Positive externalities from
realization of specialization or scale economies in services like sanitary sewer, solid waste,
drainage, and potable water present opportunities for coordination of decisions to maximize joint
returns. Feiock is currently engaged in a national study of service contracts with support from
the Aspen Institute, but networks are not being investigated in that study. Our proposal will fund
a follow up study of Florida governments to investigate how resource networks influence service
contracts among neighboring governments, how the position of governments in contractual
networks influence ILAs, and how resource and contract networks affect the resulting
performance network. We generally expect bridging networks to enhance the ability of
decentralized actors to overcome coordination problems by providing access to opportunities,
information and legitimacy. The exception is services that require players to make investments
in specific assets or other long-term commitments, which creates a greater risk and therefore
defines a cooperation rather than coordination game. For example a sanitary sewerage
agreement in which one jurisdiction treats another’s waste water can be very risky for the
primary jurisdiction. For those services, denser “strong tie” networks may best facilitate
agreement and performance.
Developments of Regional Impact (DRIs) are developments which “because of their
character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial effect of the health, safety, or welfare
of citizens in more than one county” This project will add a network component to extend
Feiock and Lubell’s ongoing NSF-supported investigation of comprehensive plan land use
ammendments. The extensiveness of the resource network among local governments and other
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local actors is expected to influence the outcomes and the length of the DRI review process.
Extensive networks increase the availability of information about other jurisdictions experience
and provide better quality information on the specific circumstances that may can reduce the
time to process a DRIs. Cooperation in maintaining and enforcing the standards is critical to the
success of DRIs. Tightly clustered strong tie networks are expected to be linked to the
maintenance and enforcement of standards and to enhance the positive effect of DRIs.
Particular attention will be directed to the position and role of regional planning councils (RPCs).
Although RPCs are required to analyze the effect of a proposed DRI on the region and issue
reports, the recommendations are not binding on the local government. Nevertheless, they may
be used by the local government in development order negotiations with the developer.
A Development Partnership is an alliance of local governments, often with the help of
private firms and nonprofit organizations, that has a mission of enhancing the economy of a
multi-jurisdictional area. The scope of actions these partnerships take on varies tremendously.
Almost all engage in regional promotion and information provision to prospective business.
Some coordinate other local development activities and a few restrict incentives and include noncompetition provisions. An NSF supported national survey of economic development by Feiock
and Steinacker identified the frequency of contacts with various categories of development actors
and city participation in development partnerships, but did not provide the more detailed
information required to map contact, contract, or performance networks. A survey of local
officials in Florida will extend this work to address these limitations and allow us to test
networked games hypotheses for development partnerships.
Extensive resource network relationships among local officials can provide resources to
facilitate partnership, reinforce cooperative norms, and promote a collective identity. Tightly
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clustered strong tie networks are expected to increase the likelihood of partnership formation
(particularly partnerships that impose constraints on development competition), the level of
cooperative activities by members, and economic development performance. A survey of local
government leaders and development officers will identify specific government units for which
contacts occur and participation in partnerships. Cooperation within a partnership will be
evidenced by resource commitments to the partnership by members and survey assessments of
their contributions to the collective efforts. Performance can be examined based on employment
and new investments measured for the partnership collectively and individual members and by
survey based assessments of partnership members.
Research Stages: Our proposed research integrates our independent studies in the
following stages: The first stage uses qualitative studies to define the components of games in
our four selected research sites, then develop theories and models of the relevant networked
games; the second stage develops and implements a set of surveys and gathers archival data for
quantitative analysis; The final stage employs game theory analyses to guide the development of
econometric tests.
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